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MOTION TO DISMISS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Comes now The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., and moves that the Court make and enter an order
dismissing the purported appeal by cross-defendant~ Edith M.
Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the Magdalene Catholic Church
3
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of East South Temple, Salt Lake Citj, Utah, also known as
Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, a corporation sole,
on the grounds and for the reasons as follows:
1. That said cross-defendants have failed to comply with

the provisions of Rule 72 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. That cross-defendants purport to appeal from an order

· which is ·not a final judgment against them, and that said
appeal fails to comply with the provisions of Rules 72 (a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN AND RICHARDS
By GEORGE M. McMILLAN
Attorneys for Defer;dant and Respondent} The Employers·'
Liability Assurance Corporation1 Ltd.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since none of the various briefs have set out the facts
material to the issues raised by the brief of the cross-defendants
and respondents, Edith M. Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the
lvfagdalene of the Catholic Church of East South Temple, Salt
Lake City, Utah, also ·known. as Roman Catholic Bishop of
Salt Lake City, a corporation sole, these facts will be briefly
set out in this reply brief to the said brief of the cross-defendants.
The cross-complaint by the respondents and def~ndant
The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., states
that the Catholic Church and the cross-defendant Hazelrigg
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are residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and that the
plaintiffs have filed the present action against the defendant
Corporation, as appears from the files and records. The crosscomplaint alleges that plaintiffs have alleged fraud in the
ad..rninistration of the Charles Carson estate.
In Paragraph 4 of the cross-complaint it is alleged that the
estate of Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson consisted solely of
assets distributed to the estate from the estate of Charles ·
Carson, and that all the benefits from the Grace Catherine
Sweeney ~arson estate caine from the estate of her deceased
husband. The paragraph further states, ttthat all of the crossdefendants \vere devisees of Grace Catherine Sweeney· Carson
and received as such devisees and legatees certain benefits,
moneys and properties from said estate; that each and all of
them were well and truly advised and had full and complete
knowledge of the· fact that all of such sums, properties and
devisees so received by them were in effect coming· to them
from the estate of Charles Carson and were each and all
of them fully advised of all of the proceedings, relationships,
family, heirs and matters concerned and pertaining to the
estate of Charles Carson.
((That particularly all of said cross-defendants were aware
of the mat~ers contained in and the various proceedings conducted and testimony introduced in the various proceedings
· and matters pursuant to the estate of Charles Carson."
It is .then alleged that all of the devisees knew of the
appointment of the surety company as surety in the Charles
Carson estate. It is then alleged in general terms that in the
event the defendant Bonding Company should have judgment
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entered against it, it should have judgment against the persons
who received the estate to the extent that these persons benefitted from the wrongful distribution. It is alleged that the
bondsman is entitled to look to the property of the estate and
((to each of the defendants to save the said The Employers'
Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., harmless as to any such
judgment" (R. 62-65).
The prayer of the cross-complaint is that in the event
the plaintiffs have judgment against The Employers' Liability
Assurance Corporation, Ltd., the said defendant and crossplaintiff have judgment against each of the cross-defendants
for the amounts, ·sums and benefits received by each of said
cross-defendants nin connection with or arising out of the
estate of either Charles Carson and/or the estate of Grace
Catherine Sweeney Carson; and further, that the Court make
and enter its order requiri~g said cross-defendants and each
of them to hold this cross-plaintiff harmless from any and all
liability arising out of or in connection with the administration
of the estate of the said Charles Carson." There is also a prayer
for general relief.
The effect of this pleadi~g is to bring before the Court
the beneficiaries of the Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson
estate, which persons are the same beneficiaries as the Charles
Carson estate, and to ask the Court to impose a trust upon the
property which the plaintiffs claim was wrongfully distributed.
In other words, the surety company say~ in substance that it
denies that there was any fraud committed in the estate of
Charles. Carson, and that is its position in the present appeal
of the order dismissing the complaint. H.owever, if there was
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fraud, and if, as plaintiffs allege, that fraud was committed
by Mrs. Carson and/ or the administrator which she appointed,
then the property distributed to the executor of Mrs. Carson's
estate and through that estate to the various devisees was
in fact received by all "rith notice of all infirmities, and the
real heirs are entitled to recover the property. In th~ event
of recovery against it, the surety company is entitled to be
subrogated to the position of the heirs and their right to follow
such assets.
This defendant m its alternative pleading against the·
cross-defendants alleges that they had notice of the same facts
which were before the Court in the Charles Carson estate,
and that if there was any fraud in the procurement of the ·
decree of distribution these cross-defendants had knowledge
of the fraud. In any event, they were not takers for value
because, as appears from the probate file of Mrs. Carson,
they \Yere only devisees and legatees of her estate. All the
assets of her ·estate consisted of the assets of the Charles
Carson estate. That being so, the Company alleges in substance and effect that it is entitled to recover over against the
cross-defendants to the extent of the value of the property
which they received.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and motion
to strike of the cross-defendants and the case went to trial upon
their answers. At the conclusoin of plaintiffs' evidence, the
defendant surety company made its motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint and the present action on the vartous grounds
stated, including that the plaintiffs had not proved extrinsic
fraud (R. 744 et seq.)
7
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The cross-defendants there upon made a motion to dismiss
the cross-complaint (R. 749 et seq.) The Court ruled that
the motion to distniss the cross-complaint was not timely because a determination had not been made at that time as to
whether the plaintiffs had proved any theory which justified
any relief against the defendants, and the motions were premature (R. 750-752). Employers did no~ rest on its crosscomplaint against cross-defendants (R. 759).
The brief of Edith M. Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the
Magdalene Catholic Church of East Temple was filed without
a petition for an intermediate appeal, despite the fact that
there has been no judgment against them on the merits.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CROSS-COMPLAINT. WAS PREMATURE AND THE
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS TO THIS COURT
ARE PREMATURE ..
. POINT NO. II
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSEOF
ACTION AGAINST THE CROSS-DEFENDANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE
8
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CROSS-COMPLAINT WAS PREMATURE ANI) THE
CROSS-DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS TO THIS COURT
ARE PREMATURE.
Rule 72 (a) of the lJtah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from
all final judgments in accordance with the rules provided.
The only procedure for an appeal from an interlocutory order
is provided in Rules 72 (b).
In the case at bar the cross-defendants made their motion that the cross-complaint against. them be dismissed before
the cross-plaintiff had even put on any· evidence, much less
before it had rested. The cross-defendants now allege as error
that the cross-complaint was not dismissed, despite the fact
that no justiciable issue has been . yet raised by the evidence
against. the cross-defendants in support of the cross-complaint
of The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. The
cross-plaintiff has not rested its case or, indeed, even submitted
evidence in support ·of its cross-complaint.
It is, of c·ourse, true that if this Court affirms the decision
of the district court, defendant, The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., will have no claim except the possibility of claiming costs for the writing of this brief on appeal
against these particular cross-defendants.. The only allegation
that is made against Hazelrigg and the Magdalene Church
by The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., is
that if there was fraud, and if plaintiffs are able to show that
the property which went into the Grace Catherine Carson
estate was fraudulently obtained, then the surety company
9
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being subr~gated to plaintiffs' rights, is entitled to follow that
·property. If this Court holds that the property was not fraudulently obtained, there is, of course, no claim against these
cross-defendants. Undoubtedly cross-defendants properly joined
in defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, but until it
was determined that the Employers Company was liable, the
alternative pleaded by the corporation did not even raise an
issue against the cross-defendants.
It is submitted that the motion to dismiss the cross-complaint was premature.
Moreover, the cross-defendants have no decision of which
they can complain at the present time in this C<?urt. They
have not had a final judgment entered against them; they,
therefore, cannot appeal from a final judgment pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 72 (a). They have not filed a petition
for interlocutory appeal, and apparently do not even purport
to claim any right to appeal under the provisions of Rule

72(b).
It is submittecl that the questions raised by the cross-defendants' briefs are premature and should not be passed upon
by the Court at ·this stage of the proceeding.

POINT NO. II
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSEOF
ACTION AGAINST THE CROSS-DEFENDANTS.
Cross-defendants, Hazelrigg and Church of the Magdalene Catholic Church, argue that the cross-plaintiffs attempt
10
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to attack collaterally the Decree of Distribution in the e.state
of Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson. The cross-defendants
do not refer to the allegation~ of the cross-complaint on the
subject. It seems clear that if there had been a careful reading
of the cross-complaint and of the theory which it presents to
the Court, cross-defendants would not have made their arguments on this point.
The plaintiffs' theory in this case, as stated in the brief
submitted to the Court, is that the administrator of the Charles
Carson estate· and the widow are guilty of extrinsic fraud in
the particulars enumerated, and that the extrinsic fraud resulted in the estate being distributed to the legal successors
in interest of Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson.. Plaintiffs
allege that in fact the estate should have been distributed in
whole or in part to them. If plaintiffs successfully establish
this proposition, they will have been able to ·require the bondsman of the administrator to. pay to them a money judgment
for
value of the property thus wrongfully distributed.
The bonding company will, of· course, be subrogated to
plaintiffs' rights. If? assuming that .the plaintiffs establish
extrinsic fraud, plaintiffs could. have followed the assets
wrongfully distributed to the 'distributee of the Charles Carson
estate and to any other persons except bona fide takers for
value, and there is no reason in principle why the bonding
company cannot pursue the same remedy in this action. That
is precisely what the bonding company pleads in the crosscomplaint.

the

Cross-defendants assert that there must be a showing of
extrinsic fraud in the Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson estate.
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This, ·however, is a complete misconception of the theory of
the cross-complaint. The bonding company alleges in substance that in the event the plaintiffs prove extrinsic fraud,
then the distributee of the Charles Carson estate, viz: Grace
Catherine Sweeney Carson, or her legal successor, had distributed to them· property tainted with fraud. Certainly no one
could dispute the proposition that if Mrs. Cq.rson had been
alive ·at the time of the decree in her husband's estate, the
plaintiffs in this action could have followed the assets and
obtained a decree declaring themselves to be the owners of
the property. In this case Mrs. Carson died before the estate
was distributed to her. The property, instead of being distributed to her directly, went to her legatees. If f.raud be proved,
it was still tainted with the same fraud; it still could be recovered by the plaintiffs in the same way unless the distributees were bona :fide takers for value. The necessity for
establishing extrinsic fraud certainly does not apply to a situation where all property in an estate is tainted with the fraud.
If I acquire blackacre ~y fraud or breach of trust, or any
other device which gives the true owner a right to maintain
an action against me to recover it, and before the action is
brought I die, who can assert that the true owner loses his
right to follow the property and maintain the judgment against
my legal successors in interest? The entire hornbook principle
of the right of the equitable owner being cut off only in the
event of transfer to a bona fide purchaser. stands as a barrier
to this notion.
Cross-plaintiffs in the case at bar do not assert that there
was any fraud in the Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson estate.
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They assert simply that if there was fraud in the Charles
Carson estate, all of the property that went into Mrs. Carson's
estate \Y~ls tained by fraud, and that the cross-defendants who
received the property took the porperty with knowledge of
the same facts, and are liable to the rightful owner to the
extent of the property received. Cross-plaintiffs standing in
the place of the rightful owners by right of subrogation are
entitled to assert this right.
There can be no objection to this position because it is
an alternative one or because it is hypothetical. Rule 8 (c) ( 2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either
in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the
alternative and one of them if made independently
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the ·insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on
·
both." * * *
Rule 8 (f) provides:
((All pleadings shall be con construed as to do substantial justice.''
Discussions of this provision in the Federal Rule indicate
that the very purpose of it vras to provide for a situation of
this kind.
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See Barron and Holtzoff Federal Practice & Procedure, Vol.
1, Sec. 282, Pages 526-532.
Under the present practice there is prov1s1on for both
alternative joinder of parties and alternative statement of claims
for relief.
It is submitted that the cases cited by the cross-defendants
in their brief are absolutely inapplicable and inappropriate to
the issues raised by the cross-plaintiffs' cross-complaint. The
principles ther contended for to the effect that the extrinsic
fraud is a prerequisite to the setting aside of a ~ecree are not .
denied. The proper construction of the pleadings, however,
does not involve this que~tion of law, but instead involves
the· application of the principles of constructive trusts and
following the rest.
The Court's attention is invited to Scott on Trusts, Vol.
3, Sections 507-552,. Pages 2431-2602, on that subject. It is
not believed that. citation of authority for the principles con. tended for is necessary.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the points raised by the
Magdalene Catholic Church and Hazelrigg in their brief
are premature. The assertions. made are in the nature of a
cross-appeal, despite the fact that no determination on the
merits has been made against them and there has been no
petition for intermediate appeal. Moreover, the position of
these· parties entirely ignores the issues tendered by the cross14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

complaint. This Court should not pass upon the issues prematurely raised. The decision of the trial court on the merits
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

McKAY, BURTON, MclviiLLAN

RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent, The Employers'
Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd.
&
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